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Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable
inquiry of existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law in numerous memoranda when she wrongly
asserted as fact and law that (1) a corporation has a duty to notify the State
of Utah of changes in its officers and directors; (2) Utah Law allows service
on a director; and (3) by definition a director is an officer and a managing
agent
28
1. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of existing
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immediately notify the State of Utah of changes in its officers and
directors, other than annually
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law, that Utah Law allows service on a director.
30

3. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of existing
law, that by "definition, a director is an officer, a managing or general
agent and is an agent of the corporation for purposes of service of
process."
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had determined that the Company was sufficiently served and that
Richards was a proper agent to accept service for the Company. . . . 38
2. Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court
had determined that Don's Amended Answer and Counterclaim was
frivolous or non-meritorious
39
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Rule 37 sanctions against the
Plaintiff/Appellee and its attorney, Brenda L. Flanders ("Flanders"), without any finding
that Flanders was "substantially justified" as required by Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P.
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness, although there are no cases precisely on point, see e.g., United Park City
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Society of
Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Notice of Appeal on
July 29, 1996. (R. 1752-53.)
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.,
sanctions against Flanders for repeatedly filing written memoranda relating to or in
opposition to the Defendants'/Appellants' motion to dismiss without a reasonable inquiry
of the facts or law and without any argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law. The trial court made no findings on this issue. The most logical
inference from the trial court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions against Flanders is that the
trial court found no violation of Rule 11.
Standard of Review: This is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See
e.g., Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1233-35 (Utah 1992); Schoney v. Memorial
-7-

Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841
P.2d 709, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 170 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) ("whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question
of law")
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Notice of Appeal on
July 29, 1996 (R. 1752-53.)
3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendants/Appellants thencosts pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., when the Plaintiffs case was dismissed
without prejudice.
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of an Amended Notice of
Appeal on January 3, 1997. (R. 1795-96.)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated. § 78-27-56, U.C.A.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before
the court; or
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(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e) (pertinent part):
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a
common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive
service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If
no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or
advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the
state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon
the person in charge of such office or place of business;...
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 (pertinent part):
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney . . . . A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address.
. . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that
he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
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incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) (pertinent part):
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33 (pertinent part):
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon any other party
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served . . . .
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing . . . The
answers are to be signed by the person making them . . . . The party upon
whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers
and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories . . .
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 (pertinent part):
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted
under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may
move for an order compelling an answer . . . .
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive
or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
- 10-

(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall, after
opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both
of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
(d) Failure of party to . . . serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request
for inspection. If a party . . . fails . . . serve answers or objections to
interrogatories . . . , the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are j u s t , . . . In lieu of any order or
in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) (pertinent part):
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either
in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action,
other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review,
shall abide the final determination of the cause. .. .
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service
of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the
court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The underlying action brought by the Plaintiff/Appellee, Hub Cap Annie, Inc.,
("HCA") was for breach of an alleged franchise agreement between HCA and
Defendant/Appellant Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. ("Company"). HCA also included as
defendants two individual incorporators of the Company, including the other appellant in
this appeal, Don C. Jensen ("Don"). However, HCA's Complaint was eventually
dismissed for insufficiency of service of process. None of the merits of HCA's causes of
action were ever tried. Rather, the 2 years of proceedings consisted of a multitude of
motions to dismiss HCA's Complaint and subsequently to impose sanctions against HCA
and its attorney, Brenda L. Flanders ("Flanders").
The Company's basis for seeking dismissal of HCA's complaint was that no proper
individual was served who could accept service for the Company. Nearly all of the
proceedings were to determine this central issue: Was Troy Richards ("Richards"), a
former employee and director of the Company, a proper person to accept service for the
Company pursuant to Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P. ?
Course of Proceedings
The trial court held only one hearing during the entire proceedings, despite dozens
of requests by the Company and Don for such hearings. One hearing was also held at the
Utah Supreme Court on a petition for extraordinary relief brought by the Company
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because Judge Peuler, who was newly assigned to this case after Judge Frederick recused
himself, would not review any of Judge Frederick's prior rulings in the case, including
the Company's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court entered an order the same day
vacating the part of Judge Peuler's minute entry which stated that she had no authority to
review Judge Frederick's rulings. The first hearing in the trial court was then held, and
HCA's Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for insufficiency of service of
process. Amazingly, this issue was first brought to the attention of the trial court in June
1995 in Don's Answer to HCA's Complaint. Nonetheless, it took from June 1995 until
April 1996 before the trial court ruled on this issue and dismissed HCA's Complaint.
Disposition
The trial court (1) dismissed HCA's Complaint without prejudice, (2) denied the
Company's request for Rule 11 and Rule 37 sanctions against HCA and Flanders, and (3)
denied costs to the Defendants/Appellants.
Relevant Facts
1. HCA, a franchisor and a Nevada corporation, brought this action against the
Company and Don on August 17, 1994.
2. The Company, an alleged franchisee, filed its Articles of Dissolution on
September 14, 1994, with Utah's Division of Corporations. Addendum L (R. 493.)
3. Don was a director and an owner of the Company, and for all times since the
filing of this action, he was the Company's only director and the only individual involved
in any meaningful activity with the Company. (R. 490.)
-13-

4. In an attempt to comply with the service requirements of Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P.,
HCA served Richards who at the time of service was a former employee/director of the
Company. (R. 45-47.) In response to such service, Richards filed, without counsel, a
one-page letter with the trial court. Addendum 2. (R. 485.) His unsigned letter clearly
stated that he had left the Company approximately six weeks prior to the date on which
he was served. Id.
5. HCA eventually served Don 276 days after the commencement of this action.
(R. 68.)
6. HCA took the position that (1) Richards was a proper person to accept service for
the Company; and (2) his unsigned letter on file with the trial court was the Company's
official "Answer" to the Complaint. (R. 401, 410, 412.) Moreover, HCA tenaciously
held to this position throughout the proceedings without any factual or legal authority.
7. The Company and Don took the opposing and eventually correct position that
(1) HCA failed to serve the Company because Richards was not a proper person to accept
service for the Company, and (2) Richards' unsigned letter could not stand as the
Company's "Answer." (R. 373-79.)
8. On February 7, 1995, Flanders conducted a deposition of Richards with no other
attorneys or parties present. (R. 402, 656.) Until early 1996, Flanders had the only copy
of that deposition, although she quoted from it several times beginning in early
November 1995 to support HCA's argument that Richards filed the Company's
"Answer." (R. 400, 402, 408, 656.)
-14-

9. Throughout protracted proceedings from October 1995 to April 1996, consisting
of scores of motions,1 HCA filed numerous memoranda which lacked any factual or legal
authority on several material issues. Such actions unduly and unreasonably prolonged
this litigation causing the company and Don to incur substantial legal expenses.
10. For months during these proceedings, Flanders refused to provide to the
Company's counsel, Michael A. Jensen ("Jensen"), the name of the court reporter who
transcribed Richards' deposition, which Flanders conducted prior to service on the
Company or Don. (R. 945-51.) The Company and Donfinallyfileda Motion to
Compel, pursuant to Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 967-68.) The trial court granted their
motion but failed to grant sanctions against HCA or Flanders. (R. 1253-56, 1734-35.)
The trial court also failed to make anyfindingsthat HCA and Flanders were
"substantially justified" in refusing to provide the name of the court reporter who
transcribed Richards' deposition, despite HCA's use of the deposition to support its
insistence that Richards was a proper person to accept service for the Company.
(R. 402, 408.)
11. Without factual or legal authority, HCA and Flanders tenaciously held to thenposition that the Company was properly served and that the "letter" on file with the trial
1

These proceedings included a petition to Utah's Supreme Court for Extraordinary Relief
when Judge Sandra N. Peuler refused to reconsider any of Judge Frederick's prior rulings, all without hearing,
whom Judge Peuler had replaced in this action after Judge Frederick recused himself from this case. The
Supreme Court entered an order the following day which clarified for Judge Peuler that she had the authority
and duty to review any prior rulings by Judge Frederick. Judge Peuler then held the first hearing, except for
the one with the Utah Supreme Court, in this action and considered the Company's Motion to Dismiss.
Shortly thereafter, Judge Peuler dismissed HCA's Complaint for failure to serve a proper person.
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court was properly the Company's "Answer." (R. 408-09.) Since HCA's position was
not based on any legal foundation, the Company and Don filed their Motion for Rule 11
sanctions against HCA and Flanders.
12. The trial court signed a Final Order on July 1, 1996, in which it dismissed
HCA's Complaint, denied the Company's and Don's Motion for Rule 11 sanctions
against HCA and Flanders, and denied the Company's and Don's Motion for
Reconsideration on their motion for Rule 37 sanctions against HCA and Flanders.
Addendum 3. (R. 1734-35.) The trial court failed to make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law on the issues relating to violations of Rules 11 or Rule 37, Utah R.
Civ. P. See id
13. Upon dismissal of HCA'a Complaint for failure to serve the Company, the
Company and Don filed on July 8, 1996, their Verified Memorandum of Costs, pursuant
to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., in the amount of $223.60. (R. 1737-38.) After further
protracted proceedings and admitted errors by the trial court,2 an order was eventually
entered denying costs to the Company and Don. Addendum 4. (R. 1791.)
14. On January 3, 1997, the Company and Don timely filed their Amended Notice
of Appeal.3

2

The trial court entered ambiguous and conflicting minute entries that required five months to
correct; the trial court eventually admitted its mistakes.
3

The trial court failed to timely forward a copy of the Amended Notice of Appeal to the Court
of Appeals. This was apparently accomplished only after counsel for the Company informed both the Court
of Appeals and the Trial Court that no such action had been taken. Accordingly, the Docketing Statement
does not include any mention of the appeal on the issue of costs. Also, that portion of the Record following
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Flanders refused to provide to Jensen the name of the court reporter who had
transcribed Richards' deposition, which was conducted by Flanders at a time when no
parties had been served and no attorneys were present. Richards' deposition was cited
repeatedly by HCA to support its contention that Richards was a proper person to accept
service for the Company. Although the trial court granted the Company's motion to
compel and ordered Flanders to provide the name of the court reporter to Jensen so that
he could obtain a copy of Richards' deposition, the trial court failed to impose any
sanctions against HCA or Flanders as Rule 37 requires. Further, the trial court failed to
find that HCA and Flanders were substantially justified in withholding the name of the
court reporter or that an award of sanctions would be unjust. Therefore, the Company
and Don brought their appeal and now contend that the trial court erred as a matter of law
by not imposing sanctions against HCA and/or Flanders.
II. Flanders violated Rule 11 numerous times in her pleadings filed with the trial
court and also with the Utah Supreme Court.4 Flanders repeatedly made unfounded and
erroneous assertions that (1) Utah law requires a corporation to immediately report any
changes in its officers and directors to the Division of Corporations; (2) under Utah law, a
corporation's officers and directors are in fact those officers and directors whose names

the Record that was indexed by the trial court's clerk.
4

See footnote 1, supra.
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appear on the most recent Annual Report on file with the Division of Corporations,
notwithstanding that such officers or directors may have resigned or departed the
corporation; (3) Utah law defines a director to be an officer for purposes of service of
process; (4) Utah law permits service on a corporation by serving one of its directors; and
(5) an unsigned letter from a former director of the Company could stand as the
Company's official and legal "Answer" to the Plaintiffs Complaint.
None of Flanders' assertions were supported by citation or reference to statute, rule,
case, or any other authority. Moreover, Flanders not once argued that existing law should
be modified or extended. In effect, Flanders repeatedly failed to make any reasonable
inquiry into the law or facts to support her material assertions and which assertions
unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings in the trial court prior to the dismissal of the
Plaintiffs Complaint for insufficiency of service of process. Despite the numerous
violations of Rule 11, the trial court denied the Company's and Don's requests for
sanctions, and the trial court also failed to articulate anyfindingsof fact or conclusions of
law on this issue. The Company and Don believe the trial court erred as a matter of law
by not imposing sanctions against Flanders.
III. Upon entry of the final order in this action, the Company and Don filed their
Memorandum of Costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ, P. However, the trial court
refused to tax any of the Defendants' costs against HCA and again failed to articulate any
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Rule 54(d) clearly grants cost* to the prevailing
party. The Company and Don were clearly the prevailing parties. The Company and
-18-

Don believe that the trial court erred as a matter of law by not taxing HCA for their
reasonably necessary costs.
ARGUMENT
L

The trial court erred by not imposing sanctions against HCA and/or Flanders
when the court granted the Company's and Don's Motion to Compel but failed
to make any findings that HCA or Flanders was substantially justified in
withholding the information sought or that sanctions would be unjust
Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P., mandates the court to impose sanctions to the prevailing

party unless the court finds that the non-prevailing party was substantially justified or that
sanctions would be unjust:
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an
order compelling discovery . . .
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall
after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or
both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred
in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that
the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(d) Failure of party to . . . serve answers to interrogatories or respond to
request for inspection. If a party . . . fails . . . serve answers or objections
to interrogatories . . ., the court in which the action is pending on motion
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are j u s t . . . In lieu of
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to
act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that
the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
Rule ^7(a)(4) & (d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
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The operative term "shall," in Rule 37(a)(4), requires the trial court to impose
sanctions, unless the court finds that opposition to the motion was substantially justified
or that sanctions would be unjust.5 Without making any findings that HCA's and
Flanders' opposition to the Company's request were substantially justified or that
sanctions would be unjust, the trial court must impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37.
Moreover, sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(d) without any prior court order
compelling HCA or Flanders to provide the information sought. See Schoney v.
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citingfrom C. Wright
and A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2291, at 812-13, 817 (1970)); see
also W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977).
The intransigence of Flanders in this matter is inexcusable. In three letters, Jensen
requested Flanders to provide the name of the court reporter who transcribed Richards'
deposition. (R. 954-56.); Addendum 5 at 1-3. In her response, Flanders stated that:
"you were told previously that Rocky Mountain Court Reporters prepared
the transcript of the deposition of Richards."
See Flanders Letter, dated January 10, 1996; Addendum 5 at 5. (R. 958.)
Instead of berating Jensen, Flanders could have easily acknowledged her error and
supplied the correct name of the reporter. Jensen's Letter, dated January 15, 1996,
expressly called this issue to her attention:
Further, there is no listing in the Salt Lake City telephone directory for a
"Rocky Mountain Court Reporters." Please clarify and please respond

5

Rule 37 also requires the court to conduct a hearing, and the court also failed to meet this
requirement.
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with all the information that I have repeatedly requested: name, address,
telephone number, and date of deposition.
See Jensen Letter, dated January 15, 1996; Addendum 5 at 7. (R 960.)
In reply, Flanders engaged in a tirade against Jensen and again offered information
that proved to be in error:
"On or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed with the Court a
Certification of Finalization of the original deposition transcript of
Tioy A. Richards."
See Flanders Letter, dated January 18, 1996; Addendum 5 at 12. (R. 965.)
No such document was ever listed in the Court's Docket for this case nor filed in the
Court's Record in this action. Moreover, Flanders failed to provide the requested
information. If the trial court had made findings on the issue of whether HCA and
Flanders were substantially justified in withholding the information sought by the
Company, the court could have reached no other rational conclusion than to find that
HCA and Flanders were not substantially justified in withholding the information sought
and no other circumstances existed to make an award to the Company unjust.
The Company's and Don's requests to Flanders were made in a series of letters, and
were not in the customary form for interrogatories or requests for the production of
documents. See Addendum 5. Nonetheless, the requests were necessary and they
focused on a single bit of information so that a copy of Richards' deposition could be
obtained. Only after months of requesting this information was a motion to compel filed.

-21-

Flanders and HCA argue that since the letters were not in the traditional form for
discovery pursuant to Rule 33, they do not fit within Rule 37 for sanctions. This is a
technicality, or form over substance, that attempts to obscure the unreasonable conduct of
Flanders. First, Rule 33 does not require any particular words, language or form in
issuing requests for discovery.6 Second, Rule 37 imposes no special language or form
requirements on the party seeking discovery. Third, Rule 37 plainly allows an award of
expenses if "the motion is granted". Fourth, whatever technical problems that may have
existed were mooted when the court accepted and granted the motion to compel without
any comment on whether technical deficiencies existed. In effect, the court sanctioned
the appropriateness of the Motion to Compel and ruled on it pursuant to Rule 37.
II.

The trial court erred by (1) not making any findings of fact or conclusions of law
on the issue of whether HCA and/or Flanders violated Rule 11, and (2) not
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Flanders for repeatedly violating Rule 11.
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., requires sanctions by using the term "shall" whenever the

court finds that the an attorney violates Rule 11:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record .. . The signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless

6

The relevant portion of Rule 33 is presented supra and the full text of the Rule is contained
in Addendum 7. The Rule only refers to an interrogatory, which is a written question. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1990).
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increase in the cost of litigation. . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
Rule 11 requires an attorney or party to make some inquiry into both the facts and
the law before the paper is filed, and the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 170
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (award of attorney fees was appropriate as a sanction for attorney's
filing an invalid document with the Complaint because a reasonable inquiry would have
disclosed that the document contained the signature of only one witness and was
therefore invalid); see also Giffen v. R. W.L., 913 P.2d 761, 763-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(sanctions affirmed because the attorney made allegations that were not well grounded in
fact and failed to make any reasonable inquiry into existing law). "This objective
approach allows sanctions to be imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the
pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith' approach." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 17. "Whether
specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law." Id. at 171. "If a
Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated." Id; see also Barton v.
Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036, n. 6 (Utah 1994) ("once a court finds a violation,
it must (1) impose sanctions and (2) be able to retain jurisdiction to enforce those
sanctions") (emphasis added).
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The Defendants request sanctions against Flanders because of many violations of
Rule 11. Only five categories of violations are specifically detailed below, although
within each category of violations, Flanders generally violated Rule 11 multiple times in
various memoranda filed by her on HCA's behalf.7
a.

Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and then failed to acknowledge
existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.
Rule 15(a) governs amendments to pleadings, including Counterclaims.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at
any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . .
Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).

The Rule clearly permits Don to amend his counterclaim once without leave of court "at
any time before a responsive pleading is served." The only response HCA offered was a
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim. However, a Motion to Dismiss is not a "responsive
pleading." See Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Don was entitled by right to amend his Counterclaim once without leave of court.

7

Most of Flanders' memoranda contain the same language, statement of facts, and arguments

- often identical.
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Therefore, HCA's Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim based on Rule 15(a) was
filed without merit.
In her Argument, Flanders asserted that a "Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim was
a responsive pleading to the Answer and Counterclaim." PI.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Strike, dated July 31, 1995 at 3 (R. 187.) Not only is her statement without any legal
foundation, Flanders failed to cite any authority, except Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., for her
assertion. Flanders also failed to acknowledge or cite Heritage, although Heritage is
expressly cited in the annotated section following Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., under the
heading of "Responsive pleading." (quotes in original). (R. 1650-52.) Flanders ignored
Heritage and failed to offer any extension, modification, or reversal of the law which
clearly holds that a "motion to dismiss" is not a responsive pleading.
From the foregoing, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry of the law. A
mere reading of the annotations following Rule 15 would have revealed to Ms. Flanders
that Don was perfectly within his rights to file an Amended Answer without leave of
court. It is equally clear that Flanders failed to make an argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing the law. Hence, Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed HCA's
Motion to Strike Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Ironically and incredibly, Flanders
had the audacity to ask the court for her attorney's fees:
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The Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed by Don must be
stricken due to his failure to comply with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and HCA should be granted its fees and costs for having to
file the Motion to Dismiss and this Motion to Strike.
PL 's Mem. in Supp. of Mot to Strike, dated July 31, 1995 at 4, (R. 188.)
Since Flanders violated Rule 11, sanctions must be imposed against her.

b.

Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed HCA's Reply Memorandum in
Support of its Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim and then failed to
make a reasonable inquiry of the alleged "Answer" of Richards.

Don's Response in Opposition to HCA's Motion to Dismiss correctly asserted that
the Company had not filed an Answer to HCA's Complaint. See Def 's Mem. in Opp 'n.,
dated September 21, 1995, at 2, 10. (R. 318, 326.) Don's knowledge was based on the
fact that he was the only active member of the Company, that he owned more than 80%
of the Company, that he was the Registered Agent for the Company, and that on
August 5, 1994, he personally fired Richards for embezzlement and other crimes. Id
In HCA's Reply Memorandum, Flanders declared that Don's "allegation simply is
false." See PL 's Reply, dated September 18, 1995 at 4, (R. 287.) However, a reasonable
inquiry of the alleged "Answer'' would have revealed to Flanders that on its face and from
Richards' own words, he left the Company more than six weeks prior to when HCA
served him. Further, his letter is unsigned and must be stricken as a matter of law
pursuant to Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., unless Richards would "promptly" sign his
"Answer."

-26-

Despite these facially obvious facts, Flanders boldly asserted that Don's Response
to the "Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim is without merit and should
be dismissed." See PI's Reply, dated September 18, 1995 at 5. (R. 288.) The alleged
"Answer" is a one-page, unsigned letter from Richards. Addendum 2. More directly at
issue, however, are Richards' own words that he had departed the Company: "I left Don
and Utah Wheels on or about August 20, 1994 due to poor working conditions and his
failure to pay wages." See Addendum 2. Richards was served on October 4, 1994
(R. 45.)
Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the validity of service on
Richards. First, an attorney would reasonably understand that an unsigned pleading must
be stricken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. Second, an attorney would also
reasonably question the validity of HCA's service of process where the person served is
initially thought to be an agent of the corporation but who, upon service, states in clear,
unambiguous language that he left the corporation more than six weeks before he was
served. See Addendum 2. Third, Richards was at most a director and never an officer of
the Company (R. 1566.) Fourth, there is no statutory basis for serving a director. See
Rule 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. There is also no rule or case law which permits service on a
director or which supports Flanders' theory of the law. These four factors compel an
attorney to seriously and reasonably question whether service of Richards was effective
and proper service on the Company. Yet, Flanders defended beyond reason her assertion
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that the Company was properly served when HCA served Richards six weeks after he
admitted leaving the Company.
At the same time, however, Flanders never once discussed or analyzed Richards'
own words, from the letter he filed with the Court or from his deposition; i.e., that he had
left the Company 6-8 weeks prior to being served. See e.g. PL 's Memorandum; (R. 395415.) Flanders failed to address this critical fact in any memoranda, although in nearly
all memoranda she vigorously argued that Richards properly filed the Company's
"Answer" to HCA's Complaint. Id
Flanders also failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the facts or the law. By
tenaciously clinging to an unreasonable position, she abused the judicial process and
violated Rule 11. Consequently, sanctions must be imposed against Flanders.

c.

Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable
inquiry of existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law in numerous memoranda when she wrongly
asserted as fact and law that (1) a corporation has a duty to notify the State
of Utah of changes in its officers and directors; (2) Utah Law allows service
on a director; and (3) by definition a director is an officer and a managing
agent.

1.

Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of
existing law, that a corporation, including a dissolved corporation, has
a duty to immediately notify the State of Utah of changes in its officers
and directors, other than annually.

In several memoranda, Flanders stated as a "Material Fact" that:
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Under Utah law, a corporation is required to register with the State
of Utah and to maintain a current accurate statement of some of the
directors and officers of a corporation. The records of the State of Utah
demonstrate that, at all times material hereto, including at present, Troy
A. Richards is and was listed as a director of Wheel Cover.
PL 's Resp. to Mot for Clarification and Reconsideration, dated March
11, 1996, at 3 17, (R. 1305.); PL 's Resp. to Pet for Extraord Relief
dated March 7, 1996, at 17 If 5, (R. 1361.); PL 's Resp, dated November
29, 1995, at 2, 8, (R. 647, 653.); PL 's Resp, dated November 2, 1995, at
2 K 5. (R. 396.)
Flanders substantially and materially relied on the above "statement of fact,"8 or
conclusion of law, throughout each of her arguments. However, not once did Flanders
cite any rule, statute, or case law to support her theory of the law regarding a
corporation's duty to "maintain a current, accurate statement of some of the directors and
officers of a corporation." Id. The conclusion of law, or statement of fact, however
characterized, is fundamentally wrong and lacks any legal support. See Danielson9
Letter, dated March 15, 1996. See Addendum 6. (R. 1560.)
Further, Ms. Flanders failed to analyze or discuss the facially obvious facts in the
Company's Articles of Dissolution. That one-page document clearly classifies Richards
as belonging to a group of shareholders that is separate and apart from the group of
shareholders comprising the Board of Directors. See Addendum 1. Flanders stated with

8

Quotes are used here because Flanders placed the paragraph quoted above in the Statement of Facts
section of her memoranda.
9

George Danielsen was at the time Division Counsel for the Division of Corporations. He
wrote a letter to the Company's counsel, Jensen, in which he clearly stated that a corporation has no duty to
keep the Division informed of changes in officers and directors. He also stated that each succeeding report
filed with the Division superseded the priorfilings,including Articles of Dissolution.
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precision the dates and contents of specific Annual Reports of the Company on file with
the Division of Corporations. See PL }s Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 9-10fflf3739. (R. 654-55.) Yet, she completely ignored any mention or discussion of the
Company's Articles of Dissolution, which is the most recent document filed. Once the
Company filed its Articles of Dissolution, it had "no further duty...to notify the Division
of Corporations of any changes in its officers or directors." Addendum 6. Moreover,
Flanders cited no authority for her theory of corporate law or her theory of service of
process on corporations. In essence, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry of
the statutes or case law on this material issue and which issue was the sole basis for her
contention that Richards was remained a director of the Company. (R. 655.)
2.

Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of
existing law, that Utah Law allows service on a director.

Flanders unreasonably and persistently argued that since Richards was a director,
service on the Company could be effectuated by service on Richards. See e.g., PL 's
Resp., dated March 11, 1996, at 22; (R. 1324, 1327-28.) PL 's Resp., dated March 7,
1996, at 33 (R. 1377.) However, Flanders failed to cite a single statute, rule, or case as
authority for her view of the law. Flanders also failed to make a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Flanders clearly violated Rule 11 and sanctions
must be imposed against her.

-30-

3.

Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of
existing law, that by "definition, a director is an officer, a managing or
general agent and is an agent of the corporation for purposes of
service of process,"

Without citing to any authority, Flanders repeatedly asserted as fact or law that "by
definition, a director is an officer, managing or general agent and is an agent of the
corporation for purpose of service of process." See e.g., PI 's Resp., dated
March 11, 1996, at 25; (R. 1327.) PI. 's Resp, dated March 7, 1996, at 34; (R. 1378.)
Pis' Resp., dated November 2, 1995, at 17. (R. 411.) There is no basis in fact or law that
such definition exists. This was a material assertion in supporting Flanders' arguments
that service on the Company was effective because Richards was a director.
Notwithstanding the fact that Richards was no longer a director of the Company at the
time he was served, Flanders insisted that he was still a director in fact because he
continued to be listed as a director in the records of the Division of Corporations; and
therefore he could be served as an agent of the Company. See id.
Flanders most obviously violated Rule 11 numerous time and sanctions must be
imposed against her.
The strenuous defense by Flanders on the issue of whether Richards was a proper
person to accept service for the Company is most bizarre and irrational at best. Since a
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), "insufficiency of service of process," is without
prejudice, Flanders knows that HCA could merely refile its Complaint and begin afresh.
Flanders should have realized that this was a frivolous fight and that her unreasonable
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defense of this issue only served to waste the court's resources, cause undue delay, and
cause unnecessary expenses to her client, to the Company, to Don and to the trial court.10
Again, Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable inquiry
into the law or facts. Accordingly, sanctions must be imposed against her.
d.

Flanders violated Rule 11 when she stated as fact, in several memoranda to
the court and in letters to Counsel for the Defendants that a Certificate of
Finalization for Richards9 deposition was in the court's file, and failed to
make a reasonable inquiry of the court's file or docket.

On November 14, 1995, Jensen began requesting information from Flanders that
would permit him to obtain a copy of Richards' deposition, which Flanders conducted in
February 1995. The central issue of this case was whether Richards was a proper person
to accept service for the Company. Therefore, his deposition potentially contained
material facts. However, Flanders never responded to Jensen's first request for the
reporter's identity made in November, 1995. See Addendum 5 at 1. He renewed his
request in subsequent letters, but Flanders repeatedly failed to provide the necessary
information by insisting that such information was available to Jensen in the court's file,
when in fact it was not available and never had been available. See Addendum 5 at 12.
For example, in a letter from Flanders dated January 18, 1996, she states:
10

At first blush, one might say the same about the Company and Don. However, prior to October
1995, Don was a pro se defendant and the Company had not been served. On January 5, 1996, Judge
Frederick acted sua sponte in entering a default judgment against the Company and awarding attorney's fees
in the amount of $13,000 to Flanders, even though Flanders never submitted an affidavit for such fees.
(R. 871-76.) Instead of filing an appeal on Judge Frederick's ruling, which was obviously in error, the
Company and Don pursued the less costly path of seeking a dismissal based on insufficiency of service of
process.
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Finally, you claim that you have not received information regarding the
identity of the court reporter that transcribed Mr. Troy A. Richards'
deposition. This is a bold misrepresentation. You have received this
information on at least three occasions. On or about June 2L 1995, the
court reporter filed with the Court a Certification of Finalization of the
original deposition transcript of Troy A. Richards. This certificate
reflects the name of the court reporter, the name of the court reporting
company, address and the telephone number. If you desired, vou could
have obtained this information. It is not mv fault that vou have been
remiss in your obligations as an attorney to your client.
See Letter from Flanders dated January 18, 1996 (emphasis added).
Addendum 5 at 12. (R. 965-66.)
Since Flanders repeatedly refused to provide the information requested, the
Defendants filed on January 22, 1996, a Motion to Compel. It was granted by the court
on February 22, 1996. (R. 1254.) The Defendants' Memorandum in Support of its
Motion to Compel expressly addressed Flanders' incorrect assertion that the "Certificate"
was on file with the trial court.
Third, Flanders continually provides false, incorrect, or misleading
information. In her letter dated January 18, 1996, she claims that
"on or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed with the
Court a Certification of Finalization of the original deposition
transcript of Troy A. Richards."
See Flanders Letter, dated January 18, 1996.
If such a document is filed with the Court, the Defendants cannot
locate it. Moreover, the Clerk of the Court cannot find it. No such
document is listed in the Court's Docket for this case. Again, Flanders
provided information that is neither correct nor helpful, yet she chastises
the Defendants' Counsel for being "remiss."
See Def. 's Mem. in Supp., dated January 22, 1996, at 8. (R. 949.)
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In HCA's Response, filed on February 5, 1996, Flanders again insisted that the
"Certificate" was available in the court's file:
This is a bold misrepresentation. Don has received this information on at
least three occasions. On or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed
with the Court a Certification of Finalization of the original deposition
transcript of Troy A. Richards. HCA received this certification in June,
1995. This certificate reflects the name of the court reporter, the name of
the court reporting company, address and the telephone number. If Don
desired, he could have obtained this information.
See PL fs Resp., dated February 5, 1996 at 3. (R. 1158.)
The "Certificate" was never in the court's file nor was it ever listed in the docket.
Despite the express, unambiguous allegation in the Defendants' Memorandum that
Flanders was wrong and that the "Certificate" was not within the court's file, Flanders
completely ignored the Defendants' challenge. Rather, she perpetuated her incorrect
assertion that the "Certificate" was on file with the court. Flanders made no reasonable
inquiry of the court's files. A simple inquiry of the court's docket for this case would
have revealed to her that no such "Certificate" was on file. A simple telephone call to the
Clerk of the court asking for an inspection of the court's file would likewise have
revealed to Flanders that no such "Certificate" was on file.
Since Flanders was so insistent on this issue, Jensen asked the Clerk of the court by
telephone whether the Certificate was in the court's file. The Clerk could not find it.
Jensen then visited the court to personally inspect the file and the docket to determine if
the Certificate was perhaps misfiled and was somehow omitted from the docket. He also
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inquired of the Clerk of the court to determine if such "Certificates" could be filed
elsewhere. All such inquiries failed to produce any evidence that the "Certificate" was
ever within the court's custody. Yet, Flanders wasted the court's resources and caused
undue delay and expense to the Defendants in obtaining the deposition of Richards,
simply because she refused to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts, in direct violation
of Rule 11.
This bizarre behavior is also evidence that Flanders distrusts other attorneys while
believing in her own infallibility. There are several examples the Defendants could cite
to illustrate this point, but in the interest of economy of words, they are excluded.
However, one example is noteworthy.
During Jensen's efforts to obtain information about Richards' deposition, Flanders
provided an incorrect name for the court reporter. See Addendum 5 at 5. When Jensen
informed her that the name she had provided was not listed in the telephone directory
(she would not provide the telephone number), she brushed that assertion aside and
refused to correct her error. See Addendum 5 at 12. Only in HCA's Response to the
Defendants' Motion to Compel did Flanders finally admit that the name she had provided
was incorrect. See PL 's Resp., dated February 5, 1996, at 4. (R. 1159.) However,
instead of being apologetic, Flanders stated that "Michael is or should be aware of this
[error], however, he is wasting the Court's resources arguing over semantics." Id
The use of t^e word "semantics" was obviously inappropriate. It was not the
meaning of the name that was at issue but the actual name so that Mr. Jensen could locate
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the telephone number. Flanders could have easily provided the telephone number as
requested, but she refused to do so. Jensen had never heard of the court reporter's name
prior to this time, and Flanders had no basis to assert that he "is or should be aware" of
the correct name. Her actions underscore her callous disregard for other attorneys and
her refusal to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts.
Most importantly, Richards' deposition proved to be of material importance. It
provided for the first time definitive evidence from a source other than Don that Richards
departed the Company in early August 1994; that he began employment with a
competitor of the Company; that he was never an officer of the Company; that he never
attended any meetings of the officers or directors of the Company; and that he never held
himself out to be an officer or director of the Company. (R. 1556-57.) His deposition
also proves that Flanders knew of this information and failed to divulge it to the court at
the very instant that she was quoting from selected parts of the deposition to show that
Richards had provided a one-page letter to the Court, allegedly as the Company's
"Answer." Since Flanders had refused to provide copies of the relevant pages from
Richards' deposition11 and also refused to provide sufficient information for Jensen to
obtain a copy of it, he suspected that she was intentionally and deceptively hiding

11

Flanders first quoted from Richards' deposition in her memorandum, dated November 2,
1995, to oppose the Company s motion to strike Richards' one-page letter as the Company's "Answer." (R.
400,402,408.) Flanders failed to attach copies of cited pages. Not until March 11, 1996, did Flanders
finally attached any pages from Richards' deposition.
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material facts from the court and the Defendants. In December, 1995, Jensen expressed
his suspicion in a memorandum:
Plaintiff purportedly deposed Richards, but Plaintiff has consistently
withheld that deposition from this Court and from the Defendants despite
efforts by Counsel for Defendants to obtain the deposition or in the
alternative to obtain the name of the Reporter from whom a copy can be
obtained. Plaintiffs withholding of such deposition is suspicious because
it [the deposition] should offer evidence on the issue of whether Richards
considers himself a Director of the Company. A reasonable and prudent
deposition of Richards should have included questions about Richards'
Director status with the Company. Plaintiffs silence on this issue has
been less than forthcoming.
See Def 's Reply Mem., dated December 4, 1995, at 10 (emphasis added).
(R. 701.)
Jensen's statement above was truly prophetic. A few days prior to his statement,
Flanders disingenuously assailed the credibility of Don's testimony about Richards'
departure from the Company. See PL 's Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 10. (R. 655.)
While Flanders was attacking Don's credibility on this issue, she possessed sufficient
knowledge that Richards' deposition fully corroborated Don's Affidavit on the issue of
when Richards' departed the Company. Withholding this information was an abuse of
the judicial process and in violation of Rule 11. Therefore, sanctions must be imposed
against Flanders.
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e.

Flanders violated Rule 11 many times by wrongly asserting that the court
had made findings or determinations, and she failed to cite to the Record
because the court had made no such findings or determinations.

1.

Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court
had determined that the Company was sufficiently served and that
Richards was a proper agent to accept service for the Company.

In numerous memoranda, Flanders vigorously defended against the Defendants'
motions by repeatedly asserting that the court had previously determined that Richards
was a proper agent to accept service for the Company. See e.g., PL 's Resp., dated March
11, 1996, at 18, 36-37; (R. 1320, 1338-39.) PL 's Resp to Petition, dated March 7, 1996,
at 29-30; (R. 1373-74.) PL 's Mem. in Support, dated January 26, 1996, at 8; (R. 990.)
PL 's Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 16-17. (R. 661-62.) Flanders failed in every
instance to cite to any part of the Record to support her assertion. Id
Flanders abused the judicial process by repeatedly asserting that the court had made
findings or determinations on this issue when it was never decided by the court until
Judge Peuler entered her Minute Entry dated April 23, 1996. (R. 1605-08.) Judge
Peuler's Minute Entry did not overturn or reverse any prior rulings. It was the first ruling
on the issue. Prior to Judge Peuler's ruling on April 23, 1996, the trial court had never
made any findings nor articulated its reasoning, its understanding of the facts, or any
conclusions of law on the issue of whether Richards was a proper person to accept
service for the Company. Moreover, it is important to note that the only findings in the
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Record, on the issue of whether Richards was a proper person for service, directly
controverts Flanders' erroneous assertion.
Flanders violated Rule 11 by repeatedly asserting that the court had made findings
when in fact it had not done so. These material assertions caused undue delays and
substantially increased the costs of this litigation. As a result, sanctions must be imposed
against Flanders.
2.

Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court
had determined that Don's Amended Answer and Counterclaim was
frivolous or non-meritorious.

It is well settled in Utah that a grant of attorney's fees is permitted by contract, by
statute, or rule. In addition to Rule 11, discussed above, Utah provides for a possible
statutory basis for the award of attorney fees:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . . .
§78-27-56, U.C.A. (emphasis added).
The number of minute entries and orders in this case is not extensive. In particular,
the Court's Minute Entry dated October 4, 1995 was brief and void of any findings of
fact or conclusions of law:
"Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim of Defendant
Don Jensen is granted for the reasons specified in the supporting
Memoranda."
See Minute Entry, dated October 4, 1995. (R. 344.)

-39-

From this terse Minute Entry, it is clear that Judge Frederick failed to make any findings
that the Company's actions were without merit or that the Company failed to act in good
faith. See §78-27-56, U.C.A.; Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; see also Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) ("trial court must make specific findings
with regard to each element of the statute"). Further, Judge Frederick failed to articulate
whether he was imposing sanctions pursuant to §78-27-56, U.C.A., or Rule 11,
Utah R. Civ. P.
Judge Frederick's failure to cite any authority for imposing sanctions is fatal since
the trial court is obligated to make its authority clear and make appropriate findings. See
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating, Co., 909 P.2d
225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citing Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (court
reversed and remanded the award of sanctions because it found it "impossible" to
determine whether the imposition of sanctions was proper as a matter of law and, if the
sanctions were imposed for a violation of Rule 11, whether the district court abused its
discretion in formulating the type and amount of the sanction)) (emphasis added).
Somehow, however, Flanders determined that she, and she alone, could read Judge
Frederick's mind, and that she could therefore proclaim to the court that his cryptic
Minute Entry made determinations that:
(1) Don's pleadings were "non-meritorious." See PI. 's Resp. dated
March 11, 1996 at 10. (R. 1310.)
(2) Don's opposition was "frivolous." See PI. 's Resp. to Petition, dated
March 7, 1996, at 44. (R. 1388.)
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(3) Don's pleadings were "non-meritorious." See Pis' Resp, dated
January 26, 1996 at 3. (R. 985.)
(4) Don's defenses were "non-meritorious". See PL 'a Resp., dated
November 29, 1995, at 14. (R. 659.)
In every instance above, Flanders argues that since the court had already made
findings, the law of the case doctrine prevents the court's review of the court's own
rulings. Yet, Flanders never cited to the Record to show where the court had made
findings or determined the issue of whether Don's actions were lacking in merit or put
forth in bad faith.
Flanders repeatedly violated Rule 11 by failing to make any reasonable inquiry into
the facts, in this case the Record, and the law. Accordingly, sanctions must be imposed
against Flanders for her violations.

III. The trial court erred by denying costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d), to the Company
and Don following the court's granting their Motion to Dismiss, and in doing so,
the trial court also failed to make any findings on whether the Company's costs
were taxable costs.
Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., requires costs to be awarded to the prevailing party as a
matter of law:
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs;
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause....
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Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs to mean "those fees which are required
to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be
included in the judgment." See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
HCA initiated the instant action. Don and the Company responded reasonably and
appropriately, and they minimized their costs. The trial court, however, required Don to
pay fees to file his compulsory counterclaim and to demand a trial by jury. It was
necessary for him to pay these fees in order to preserve the Company's counterclaim12
and the right to a trial by jury.
When the case was finally dismissed, the fees previously paid to the trial court were
not refunded nor were those fees transferable to the identical case filed again by HCA.13
It is manifestly unjust to require the Company and Don to pay the same fees twice simply
because HCA and Flanders failed to properly serve its action in the first place. HCA has
only itself to blame for its failure.

12

Don's counterclaim was properly filed as a derivative action which belonged to the Company.

13

The Plaintiff filed the same action against the same defendants on June 7, 1996, filed as Case
No. 960903093. The Plaintiff did not even wait for the Court's Final Order to be signed.
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a.

The Court's filing fee for a jury demand is mandatory, and the Company
and Don have a fundamental right to a trial by jury.

It is immaterial whether a jury was used in this action. Perhaps it is unfortunate that
the trial court does not refund the jury fee when a jury is not used. However, pursuant to
Rule 38, Utah R. Civ. P., the Company and Don were required to make their jury demand
"not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading." Thus, this fundamental
right would have been lost if it had not been demanded in a timely manner and with fee
paid.
Again, HCA filed a duplicate action against the Company and Don even before the
Final Order was signed. Thus, Don and the Company were put in the unjust position of
being required to again pay to the court the same fees they paid in the prior case. Had
HCA properly commenced its action, the Company and Don would have avoided
duplicate costs. Again, the Plaintiff has only itself to blame.
b.

Since HCA extensively relied on the deposition of Richards in an attempt to
justify its service of process, the Company sought a copy of his deposition in
an effort to rebut HCA's argument.

Utah's Supreme Court has specifically ruled that costs of depositions are not
recoverable unless "the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good faith and, in
the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and
presentation of the case." See Morgan 795 P.2d at 687 (citing Frampton v. Wilson, 605
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P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980)) (holding that depositions need only be "reasonably
necessary").
In the instant case, HCA, through Flanders, repeatedly and consistently relied on
Richards' deposition in an attempt to persuade the court that Richards was a proper
person to accept service for the Company. (R. 1375, 1416.) HCA and Flanders also
intentionally withheld the court reporter's identity from Jensen.14 Jensen only obtained a
copy of Richards' deposition after the Court so ordered. In fact, the deposition was most
revealing. It clearly showed that Richards had left the Company's employment nearly
two months before he was served with HCA's Complaint. It also clearly showed that
Richards was never an officer of the Company nor did he know that he was a director of
the Company. (R. 1556-57.)
The Company brought to HCA's and the trial court's attention that Richards' letter
expressly admitted that he had left the Company's employment nearly two months prior
to being served. However, HCA consistently ignored this fact and failed to acknowledge
Richards' statement. The court also failed to acknowledge Richards' own statement.
Only after the court and HCA had clearly ignored this critical fact and only after HCA

14

The use of "intentionally" may be viewed as presumptuous. However, the logical inference
from the following facts led the Company and Don to confidently assert that Flanders' conduct in withholding
Richards' deposition was intentional. Flanders expressly and frequently cited to Richards' deposition,
including reference to specific pages of his deposition. Yet, she failed to attach any copies of Richards'
deposition or any of the pages she cited until March 11, 1996. The reasons for such omissions appear clear
when one readsfromthe pages cited, because Richards' testimony substantiates the fact that (1) Richards left
the Company weeks prior to being served and (2) that he was never an officer of the Company. Richards also
admitted that he was unaware that he was listed as a director in the records of the Division of Corporations.
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had used Richards' deposition as support for its argument that Richards was an officer
and director of the Company, did the Company obtain a copy of Richards' deposition.
Had HCA or the trial court addressed this issue, the need for Richards' deposition could
have been avoided altogether.
It is unclear from the Court's order whether the court relied on Richards' deposition.
Addendum 3. (R. 1734-35.) It is clear however, that the Company submitted to the court
Richards' testimony from his deposition to rebut HCA's argument that Richards was an
officer and director of the Company when he was served with HCA's Complaint.
(R. 1566.) Even if the Court did not rely on Richards' deposition in its final analysis, the
deposition was, at the time and under the circumstances, "reasonably necessary" for the
"development and presentation of the [Company's] case." See Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Company did not act in good faith in obtaining a
copy of Richards' deposition. Had HCA not relied on Richards' deposition, the
Company would not have had any reason to obtain a copy of it. Again, HCA has only
itself to blame.
CONCLUSION
Flanders' flagrant violations of Rule 11 are too numerous to cite all of them.
Nonetheless, in each instance, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the
law or facts to support her statements of fact or her assertions of law. The trial court
failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in denying Rule 11 sanctions
against Flanders or HCA. However, it is clear that Flanders frequently violated Rule 11.
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The trial court also erred in not imposing sanctions against Flanders or HCA
pursuant to Rule 37, when the trial court granted the Company's and Don's motion to
compel but failed to find that Flanders or HCA were substantially justified in withholding
the information sought or that an award of sanctions would be unjust.
The trial court further erred when it failed to tax costs against HCA when HCA's
Complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of service of process after more than 20
months of costly proceedings. Again, the trial court failed to make any findings, although
the Company and Don specifically requested, by motion, the trial court to make such
findings on their costs. (R. 1764-65.)
The Company and Don now urge this Court to rule as a matter of law that Flanders
violated Rule 11 numerous times, that the trial court erred by not imposing sanctions
against Flanders or HCA pursuant to Rule 37, and that the trial court erred by not taxing
the Defendants' costs against HCA. If this Court so rules, these matters should be
remanded to the trial court to impose sanctions and costs consistent with this Court's
rulings.

DATED this 5th day of May 1997.

Michael A. Jensen, ^scj/(7231)
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

don\appeals\brief_l.app May 5,1997
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Court of Appeals Case No. 960592-CA
Third District Court Case No. 940905231CV

HUB CAP ANNIE, INC.
v.
DON C. JENSEN AND WHEEL COVER MARKETING, INC.
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Appellants in the above action, hereby certify that
on this day I personally served the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS by personally
depositing two copies thereof with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to:
BRENDA L. FLANDERS
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-3839

DATED this 5th day of May 1997.

Witt,

-Tt^

MICHAEL A. J E ^ N , Esq

don\appeals\bnef_l app May 5,1997
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ADDENDUM INDEX

Addendum 1
Articles of Dissolution, dated September 1,1994, Registered on
September 14,1994. (R. 493.)
Addendum 2
Richards' Letter, dated October 10,1994,filedon October 21,1994.
(R. 485.)
Addendum 3
Trial Court's Final Order, dated July 1,1996; signed Minute Entry dated
May 28, 1996. (R. 1734-35.)
Addendum 4
Trial Court's Order on Costs, dated December 17,1996. (R. 1791.)
Addendum 5
Exchange of letters between Jensen and Flanders. (R. 954-66.)
Addendum 6
LetterfromGeorge Danielson, dated March 15, 1996, former Counsel
to Division of Corporations. (R. 1506-07.)
Addendum 7
Full Text of Rules 4,11,15, 33, 37, and 54, Utah R. Civ. P., as
electronically copiedfromMichie's LAW ON DISC™

don\appeals\brief_l.app May 5,1997
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DKPAKTMKNT OK COMMKRCK
Division of Corporations & Commcrrml ("ode

Articles of Dissolution
RECEIVED

Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation
adopts the following Articles of Dissolution:
g £ p j L |QOA
Must be typewritten

UTD/V.0fC0UP.&C0WM.C00E

First:

This name of the Corporation is:

Second:

Whcol Cover k a r k e t i n ^ , I n c . dl>a Utah Wheebs
This dissolution was approved by the shareholders.

Covers

A. The number of votes entitled to be cast, by voting group, on the proposal for dissolution
is:
Voting Group
Number of Votes
2*0,000

Board of Directors
Troy jiicriarch

Third:
Fourth:

J ,000

B. The total number of votes to be cast for dissolution was: 21 ,C0C
The totaJ number of votes cast against dissolution was;
00
OR
The total number of votes cast for dissolution by each voting group was
.
This number was sufficient for approval.
This dissolution was authorized by the shareholders on: August 5, 19 9^
The address of the Corporation's principal office or other address where service of process
may be mailed:
1124- E. 3300 Co.
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8^106
Street Address

Zip

City/State

Under penaltte^of perjury, I declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and
are, to the best of ray loiQ^dj^ellnd belief, true, correct and complete.
By:
Cy^^
Cf • -Ui,i^^—
Title:. ^v-.-'lV':;us
Dated:

^ept.

1,

199^

Send forms in duplicate to:
SPECIAL NOTE:
Utah law requires corporations
seeking dissolution to satisfy all
outstanding state taxes the
corporation owes. Please inquire
with the Utah Tax Commission at:
I (801) 530-4848

State of Utah
Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code
160 East 300 South/Box 45801
otwmtfcfei*** Salt Lake City, Ut.84145-0801
qivMo. of Corporation, • # < * » * « ( 2 * „ ( f l 0 1 )
jHmby certify that the
4nd approved
lb tht offlct '

Extmfntr.

(£/^/
J-MtxL

corpsdba/dissolution.3/93

KORLA T. WOODS
Division Director

5304849
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2240 W. 3800 S., Apt. I 307
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
October 10, 1994

J(<Cn c

To Whom It May Concern:
RESPONSE TO:

'C'~:vw;s ?-,--.£.. £ R I C K

Hub Cap Annie, Inc.
vs •
Jim and Don Jensen
Civil Case #^43r^O4^0 ° ^ ^ Q \ o ^ ^ ' V \
I, Troy Richards, was hired by Don C. Jensen, representing himself
as the owner of a Hubcap Annie franchise in Salt Lake City, Utah,
on or about March 12, 1993. My employment was for the purpose of
sales and service of automotive parts, i.e. hubcaps, wheel covers
and related items. I assumed the company was a legal and licensed
company doing business in the State of Utah.
Shortly after hire, I was told by Don C. Jensen that the Hubcap
Annie name would be terminated and the company would operate under
a new name, i.e. Utah Wheels and Covers.
I was instructed to
remove decals, labels, etc. containing the Hubcap Annie name, and
to remove the name from the store front, company vehicles, etc..
I had no knowledge of what, if anything, was transpiring between
Don Jensen and Hubcap Annie, Inc..
I left Don and Utah Wheels on or about August 20, 1994 due to poor
working conditions and his failure to pay wages.
If I may be of further assistance, please contact me.
Sincerely,

T. A. Richards

A r

t\ /• -s

Tab 3

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
720 E. Three Fountains Dr #74
Murray, UT 84107-5252
(801)288-9428
FAX: 288-0708

JUL - 1 13SS

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Third District Court Clerk: 535-5 111; In-Court Clerk 535-5678
HUB CAP ANNIE, INC.
Nevada corporation,

FINAL ORDER

Plaintiff
CIVIL NO. 940905231
v.
DON C.JENSEN, and
WHEEL COVER MARKETING, INC.

Honorable Sandra N. Peuler

Upon consideration of several motions by the Defendants, it hereby is

ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is Granted without picjudice
because the Plaintiff attempted to sei've Defendant Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. by

6*?

i'litfuiTuuriy serving Mr. Troy A. Richards, who was not at the time a proper person for
service as contemplated by Rule 3, Utah II Civ, P., atTtHvTto^a4-tt^vised-thePlaintiff on-

^D

October 21, 1994^aHte4ia4m^trestxTO^

thc-DefbrdaiTtxorpGration, and no othei

Defendant was served within 120 days as required by Rule 3; and it further is

ORDERED, that the Default Judgment entered against Wheel Cover Marketing,
Inc., dated Januaiy 5, 1996, be vacated because the Plaintiffs Complaint, upon which
such judgment was predicated, is dismissed and the Defendants' request for attorney's
fees is denied; and it further is

ORDERED, that the Judgement entered against Don C. Jensen, dated
October 23, 1995, is set aside and vacated; and it further is

ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Brenda L
Flanders is denied; and it further is

ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration,
in which the Defendants' sought Rule 37 sanctions against Brenda L. Flanders, is denied

DATED this

/

day of June, 1996.

vOf^^Cv

csJ&J^

SANDRA N. PEULER
Third District Court Judge

don\ordcr 2.tin June 18, 1996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HUB CAP ANNIE, INC., a
Nevada corporation.
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 940905231

vsJ
JAMES R. JENSEN, DON C.
JENSEN and WHEEL COVER
MARKETING, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

After a review of the pleadings in this matter, the Court
rules as follows:
1.

The Judgment entered against Don Jensen on October 23,

1995, is set aside.
2.

Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is denied.

3.

Defendant's Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration

is denied.
Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an Order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated this £g

day of May, 1996.

SANDRA N. PEULER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Tab 4

nun sitrz.z- z
Third Judicial P'-'rict

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
720 E. Three Fountains Dr #74
Murray, UT 84107-5252
(801)288-9428
FAX: 288-0708

DEC 1 7 1S96

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
240 I vast 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Third District Court Clerk: 535-5HI; In-Court Clerk: 535-5678

HUB CAP ANNIE, INC.
Nevada corporation,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL NO. 940905231CV
DON C.JENSEN, and
WHEEL COVER MARKETING, INC.

Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Defendants

Upon reviewing the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and the Plaintiffs
opposition in the form of a Motion to Tax, and the Defendants' opposition memorandum,
the Court hereby orders that the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs is denied.

DATED this

H

day of December 1996.
'"V

Judge Sandra N. Peuler .*;
Third District Court Judge {
y

Tab 5

MICHAEL A. JKNSKN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
720 Easl Three Fountains Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utah 84107-5252 • (801) 288-9428 • Pax: 288-070*

November 14, 1995

Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing & Don C. Jensen
Civil No. 940905231

i

Dear Ms. Flanders:
Please forward to me the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of all
persons or institutions you deposed on the above matter. Also, please provide the full
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the respective Reporters for each
deposition so that I may order copies as appropriate.

Very truly yours,

Michacl ArJensen
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.

MICHAEL A. JENSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
7 2 0 East Tliree F o u n t a i n s Drive # 7 4 • Murray, U t a k 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • ( 8 0 1 ) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • F a x :

288-0708

January 4, 1996

Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. ct al
Civil No. 940905231

Dear Ms. Flanders:
Please be advised that I have conflict with your proposed date to depose my
client, Don C. Jensen, on January 17, 1996. We will need to reschedule it. I suggest
the dates of Friday, Febmary 2, 1996 or Monday, February 5, 1996. Please confirm
which date is better for you. More importantly, however, since our Motion to
Dismiss is pending before the Court, I request that you wait until the Court rules on
that motion before conducting any further depositions.
Also, I have not received a reply to my letter requesting the name, address, and
telephone number of the Reporter who prepared the transcript of the deposition of
Mr. Troy Richards. I should appreciate your reply on this matter.

Very truly yours,

Michael Arfensen
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.

V \i U

•

• •?

MICHAEL A. JKNSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
7 2 0 liasl Three Fountain* 1 >i ive / / 7 4 • Murray, Ul.ili 8 H 0 7 - 5 " i 5 ? • (801) 288-9V.IS

• ! ; ..x: ' 1 8 8 - 0 7 0 8

January 8, 1996

Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al
Civil No. 940905231

Dear Ms. Flanders:
I am in receipt of your Notice of Rescheduled Date of Deposition. However, I
still have conflicts with any date that week and will not be able to attend aay
depositions that week. In my letter of January 4th, I suggested two other dates.
However, I now request your cooperation in holding any further depositions in
abeyance until (1) we can obtain a copy of the deposition you apparently conducted
of Mr. Troy Richards; and (2) until the Court rules on our Motion to Dismiss. If you
will not cooperate with us on this matter, we will be forced to seek a protective order.
Notwithstanding this request, I renew my request for the third time for the
name, address, and telephone number of the Reporter who piepared the transcript of
the deposition of Mr. Troy Richards. I should appreciate your reply on this matter.

Veiy truly yours,

Michael ArJensen
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.

v

\J *» *l

MICHAEL A. JHNSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
7 2 0 East T h r e e F o u n t a i n s Drive # 7 4 • Murray, U t a h 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • ( 8 0 ] ) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Fax:

288-0708

January 10, 1996

Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al
Civil No. 940905231

Dear Ms. Flanders:
I am representing Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. Accordingly, all
communications, including copies of motions, notices, etc., should be sent to my
attention at the above address. I formally filed a Notice of Appearance with the
Court on November 14, 1995 and mailed a copy to you.
I notice that you continue to send copies to Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. in
C/O of Mr. Troy Richards. That is improper for two basic reasons:
(1) Mr. Richards is no longer associated with Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc; and
(2) Even if he were part of the company, I am legal Counsel for Wheel Cover
Marketing, Inc. and it is a violation of Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
for you to continue to communicate with the company other than through me.
You are hereby requested to cease all communications with the Defendant,
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc., except through me, the company's only legal
representative.
Very truly yours,

%idA$f*Michael A. Jenserr
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.

CC: Cindy Beverly, Judge Frederick's In-Court Clerk

FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
56 East Broadway
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 355-3839
Telefax (801) 355-6955

Brenda L. Flanders
Dena C. Sarandos

January 10, 1996

Michael A. Jensen
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74
Murray, Utah 84107-5252

•Re; Hub Cap Annie, Inc..
Civil No. 940905231

v. Wheel Cover Marketing,

Inc.

Dear Michael:
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 8, 1996. I am
not inclined to reschedule the deposition for Don Jensen again. In
your previous letter, you requested that I reschedule Don's
deposition.
I tried to accommodate you by rescheduling the
deposition for January 19, 1996. Unless you provide me with a
compelling and legitimate reason for continuing the deposition, I
will not do so. In addition, I will file a Motion to Compel and
for Sanctions against you and your client. Clearly, you and your
client already have caused excessive delay in this case.
Finally, you were told previously that Rocky Mountain Court
Reporters prepared the transcript of the deposition of Troy
Richards.
I look forward to hearing from you regarding the deposition of
Don Jensen.

cc:

Rose U. Bowe

3rend& L. Flanderi_
"F3randoVs^&. -Asscyc:.iatj

0 V V •' e; 's

.r

FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
56 East Broadway
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 355-3839
Telefax (801) 355-6955

Brenda L, Flanders
Dena C. Sarandos

January 11, 1996

Michael A, Jensen
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74
Murray, Utah 84107-5252
-Re; Hub Cap Annie, Inc. , v. Wheel Cover Marketing.
Civil No. 940905231

Inc.

Dear Michael:
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 10, 1996
regarding your demand that I do not send copies of pleadings to Mr.
Troy Richards for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. May I remind you
that Judge Frederick ruled that Don Jensen cannot pursue claims on
behalf of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.
Accordingly, he cannot
retain you to do so. Wheel Cover is no longer is a viable party in
this action. Judge Frederick has executed the default judgment
against Wheel Cover Marketing Inc.
You have copied Cindy Beverly, Judge Frederick's clerk, on
your letter. If you continue to make ex-pvte communications with
the Judge, I will file a Motion to Strike the Answer filed for Don
Jensen and will request sanctions against you personally.
Finally, Judge Frederick ordered your client to pay $1,156.32
before he would decide any further motions. If your client does
not remit payment of this amount, I wilJU-P£oceed with a collection
action against him.
S
"^\
Sincerfe^J-Nc / \

cc:

Rose U. Bowe

\

Brenda I/. FlaniSenk
Flanders \&^Associa):e
—
—-. ~z^L—

o o •;
(o

MICHABL A, JENSEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
720 East Tkrcc Fountains Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utali 84107-5252 • (801) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Pax: 2 8 8 - 0 7 0 8

FAX LETTER: Original to follow by mail.

January 15, 1996

Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al
Civil No. 940905231

Dear Ms. Flanders:
I received on Friday your letter dated January 10, 1996, and on Saturday, I
received your letter dated January 11, 1996. Your lack of cooperation in this matter
is disappointing. However, your baseless statements and threats are very disturbing.
Let me address them in numbered paragraphs so that you can respond appropriately .
1. In your January 10th letter, you stated that,
"I tried to accommodate you by rescheduling Don's deposition
for January 19, 1996."
Please clarify this statement because I am unaware that you rescheduled the
deposition to January 19th at my request. My request was for February 2nd or 5th, or
for postponing any depositions until the Court rules on the issue of jurisdiction.
2. Also, in your letter of January 10th, you claim that you previously informed
me of the reporter's identity for Mr. Richards' deposition. I have never received such
information. Please identify the form and date of the communication in which that
information was conveyed. Further, there is no listing in the Salt Lake City telephone
directory for a "Rocky Mountain Court Reporters." Please clarify and please respond
with all the information that I have repeatedly requested: name, address, telephone
number, and date of deposition.
ii it \i •> ii W
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3. Since I had not received a response from you, I filed and served a motion for
protective order last Friday, January 12, 1996. As you are well aware, sanctions are
inappropriate under Rule 37(d) upon our application for relief under a protective
order. Accordingly, if you seek sanctions against us, we will seek Rule 11 sanctions
against you.
4. Again, in your January 10th letter you allege that my client and I "already
have caused excessive delay in this case." This may be your assessment but the facts
speak otherwise. First, your insistence that the letter filed with the Court by Mr.
Richards was a legitimate "answer" was without merit since any unsigned pleading
must be stricken under Rule 11 and the Court obviously agreed. Your continued
defense of that untenable position caused excessive delays in this case.
Second, you continue to stubbornly cling to the notion that Mr. Richards is a
director of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. That is an absurd position. You have
proffered no evidence. More importantly, you completely ignored Mr. Richards'
own statement that he left the Company "on or about August 20, 1994." You also
completely ignored the Company's Articles of Dissolution. And, you falsely claimed
that Utah law requires a dissolved corporation to keep the State informed of changes
in its officers and directors. There is no such law or regulation and you know it.
Again, your baseless assertions have caused excessive delays in this case.
5. In your letter of January 11th, you again make threats of sanctions:
"You have copied Cindy Beverly, JudgeTrederick's clerk, on
your letter. If you continue to make ex-parte communications
with the Judge, I will file a Motion to Strike the Answer filed
for Don Jensen and will request sanctions against you
personally."
Perhaps you misapprehend the meaning of "ex parte"; it means "one sided." Can
you identify any communication in this instance which is one-sided? Such threats are
without proper legal foundation when you incorrectly state the facts.
6. Also, in your letter of January 11th, you assert another nonexistent fact:
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"May I remind you that Judge Frederick ruled that Don Jensen
cannot pursue claims on behalf of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc.
Accordingly, he cannot retain you to do so. Wheel Cover is no
longer a viable party in this action."
Please identify which of Judge Frederick's rulings prohibits my representation of
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. And if I cannot represent the Company, who can? Arc
you asserting that the Company is not entitled to legal representation? Also, you
appear to be asserting that the Company has no right of appeal and that the default
judgment is final. If that is your contention, then will you oppose a motion for
certification on that judgment? If you do not agree that I am the legal representative
of the Company and follow Rule 4.2 of Utah's Professional Code of Conduct, I will
be forced to establish that recognition by appropriate action with the Court.
Finally, please understand that my clients and I are prepared to use eveiy
avenue available to us throughout these proceedings to defeat your baseless
assertions. We are confident that we will prevail on all the issues that we have raised
so far. Judge Frederick is tragically in error on this matter so far but that will be
reversed in the near future.

Very truly yours,

%idA^f^
Michael A. Jensefr
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing and
Don C. Jensen

MlCHAHL A. JENSEN, ATTORNEY AT LAV
7 2 0 East Tliree F o u n t a i n s Drive # 7 4 • Murray, U t a k 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • (801) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Pax: 2 8 8 - 0 7 0 8

FAX LETTER: Original to follow by mail.

January 18, 1996
Brenda L. Flanders
Flanders & Associates
56 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al
Civil No. 940905231

Dear Ms. Flanders:
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of today.
My client, Don C. Jensen, will not be at the deposition you scheduled for
Friday, January 19, 1996. As I have repeatedly told you, I have a conflict and have
suggested two alternative dates, both of which you ignored. More importantly,
however, my clients should not be subjected to depositions until the Court rules on
our motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
Since you have been notified that we will not be present, you are expected to
mitigate any damages. Therefore, your threat to "have the reporter present"
tomorrow and to attempt to collect those costs is reprehensible.
With a new judge, we expect that a hearing will be held in the near future and
that this entire matter will be properly and fairly resolved. In the meanwhile,
postponing depositions, other discoveiy, and collection attempts on judgments should
be held in abeyance. Your cooperation will be appreciated.
Finally, you continue to deny us the information regarding Mr. Richards'
deposition. You claim that you gave me the information in a telephone call on
November 13, 1995. Please provide some verification of that allegation since I have
no record of it. More to the point, however, why do insist on denying us that basic
information? Your lack of cooperation on this matter is beyond belief and far beyond
the civility required by our Professional Code of Conduct. Why you cannot simply
J 1/ 0 l< ^ 4
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send a letter or a fax with the information which we have requested numerous times
(name, address, telephone, and date of deposition) is incomprehensible. Instead of
arguing that we should be able to have the information, why do you not simply send
it once and for all? It would save a lot of time and contention.

Very truly yours,

Michael A. JensetK
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing and
Don C. Jensen
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FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
56 East Broadway
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 355-3839
Telefax (801) 355-6955

Brcnda L Flanders
Dena C Sarandos

January 18, 3 996
VIA HAND-DELIVERY
Michael A. Jensen
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74
Murray, Utah 84107-5252
Re:

Hub Cap Annie, Inc.,
Civil No. 940905231

v. Wheel Cover Marketing,

Inc.

Dear Michael:
In your letter dated January 15, 1996, you reiterate that you
have filed a protective order to prevent Don Jensen from testifying
at his deposition which is scheduled on January 19, 1996. This is
unacceptable. Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
specifically states that "the court in the district where the
deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party" from a deposition. You have not obtained such
an order. Consequently, I expect you to instruct your client to
attend his deposition that has been scheduled for January 19, 1996.
If your client does not attend, I will spek sanctions against him
and you and request an award for the costs" of the deposition.
You indicate that sanctions are inappropriate under Rule 37(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Your interpretation of this
rule is incorrect. I suggest you reread the rule and scrutinize
the language more carefully.
Finally, you claim that you have not received information
regarding the identity of the court reporter that transcribed Mr.
Troy A. Richards1 deposition. This is a bold misrepresentation.
You have received this information on at least three occasions. On
or about June 2 , 1995, the court reporter filed with the Court a
Certification of Finalization of the original deposition transcript
of Troy A. Richards. This certificate reflects the name of the
court reporter, the name of the court reporting company, the
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address and the telephone number. If you desired, you could have,
obtained this information. It is not my fault that you have been
remiss in your obligations as an attorney to your client.
In
addition, I told you the court reporter's company name during a
conversation we had over the telephone. Also, last week, you were
sent the name of the court reporter who transcribed the deposition
of Troy A. Richards.
It is unfortunate that you do not follow the rules of
professional responsibility and the rules of civil procedure. I
hope that you terminate your baseless allegations that the
information regarding the court reporter has not been divulged to
you.

Brenda
FlaTidecs_&
cc:

R o s e U. Bowe
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code

Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
Douglas C. Borba
Executive Director
Korla T. Woods
Division Director

Mm 1 8 1996

Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South/RO. Box 45801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801
(801)530-6024
(801) 530-6438 (FAX)

March 15, 1996
Michael A. Jensen, Attorney-at-law
First Interstate Plaza, Ninth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
RE:

Duty of Corporation to report changes in its officers and directors.

Dear Mr. Jensen:
In response to the question of whether a corporation has a duty to report to the State of
Utah any changes in its officers or directors, I offer the following statement:
Pursuant to §16-10a-302, Utah Code Annotated, a corporation may elect directors and
appoint officers and agents of the corporation. Pursuant to §16-10a-808, U.C.A., the
"shareholders of a corporation may remove one or more directors with or without cause unless
the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for cause." Pursuant to
the same §16-10a-808, a "director who is removed pursuant to this section may deliver to the
division for filing a statement to that effect pursuant to §16-10a-1608." The operative word
"may" in the preceding sentence is permissive and not mandatory. The Commentary to §16-10a1608 reinforces this point by stating that the section allows a person to file such a statement.
To benefit from the statutes governing corporations, the Division requires that an active
corporation file an Annual Report each year. This Report requires the listing of current officers
and directors. As each Annual Report is filed, it supersedes the prior Annual Report. Further,
changes in officers and directors that occur between the filing of Annual Reports maybe reported
to the Division as an Amended Annual Report. However, there is no requirement for a
corporation to file an Amended Annual Report or to report the changes in its officers and
directors that occur during the time period between Annual Reports. Once again, the
Commentary to §16-10a-1608 indicates that a corporation may file an amended annual report to
accomplish the result provided under § 16-1 Oa-1608.
However, once a corporation files pursuant to §16-10a-1403, U.C.A., Articles of
Dissolution, the dissolved corporation has no further duty to file an Annual Report or to notify
the Division of any changes in its officers or directors. In fact, the Commentary to §16-10a-1403
states that articles of dissolution "is the only filing required for a voluntary dissolution"
(emphasis added).

Michael A. Jensen
March 15, 1996
page 2
I hope this has adequately responded to your concerns
Sincerely,

George Danielson
Division Counsel
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Rule 4
Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued
by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses
may be signed and served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1),
the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint
unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought
against two or more defendants on which service has been
obtained upon one of them within the 120 days or such longer
period as may be allowed by the court, the other or others may be
served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of
the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the
action, and the county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of
the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address
and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the
defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall
notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either
that the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint
will be filed with the court within ten days of service. If service is
made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject
matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that
the complaint is on file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served
in this state or any other state or territory of the United States, by
the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United
Slates Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person
18 years of age or older at the time of service, and not a party to
Addendum 7: 1 of 15

the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs
(2), (3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or
the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at
the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process;
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a
copy to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or
guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any
person having the care and control of the infant, or with whom the
infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed;
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound
mind or incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a
copy to the person and to the person's legal representative if one
has been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to
the individual, if any, who has care, custody or control of the
person;
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility
operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by
delivering a copy to the person who has the care, custody, or
control of the individual to be served, or to that person's designee
or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be served if
one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver
the process to the individual served;
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon
a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject
to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the
agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If no
such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the
defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office
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or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does
business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in
charge of such office or place of business;
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy
thereof to the recorder;
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of
such county;
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a
copy to the superintendent or business administrator of the board;
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to
the president or secretary of its board;
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are
authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a copy to
the attorney general and any other person or agency required by
statute to be served; and
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon
any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by
delivering a copy to any member of its governing board, or to its
executive employee or secretary.
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a
foreign country shall be made as follows:
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a
corporation, partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an
officer or a managing general agent; provided that such service be
made by a person who is not a party to the action, not a party's
attorney, and is not less than 18 years of age, or who is designated
by order of the court or by the foreign court; or
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to
be served as ordered by the court. Proof of service in a foreign
country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service
within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order
of the court. When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this
subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee
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satisfactory to the court.
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the
person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained
through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the
individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be
served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an
order allowing service by publication, by mail, or by some other
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to
identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the
individual parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order
service of process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the
court, by other means, or by some combination of the above,
provided that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably
possible or practicable. The court's order shall also specify the
content of the process to be served and the event or events as of
which service shall be deemed complete. A copy of the court's
order shall be served upon the defendant with the process
specified by the court.
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the
party serving the process shall file proof of service with the court
promptly, and in any event within the time during which the
person served must respond to the process, and proof of service
must be made within ten days after such service. Failure to file
proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of
service shall be made as follows:
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the
deputy of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the
date, place, and manner of service;
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as
to the date, place, and manner of service, together with the
affiant's age at the time of service;
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(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or
printer or that person's designated agent, showing publication, and
specifying the date of the first and last publications; and an
affidavit by the clerk of the court of a deposit of a copy of the
summons and complaint in the United States mail, if such mailing
shall be required under this rule or by court order;
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of
the court showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and
complaint in the United States mail, as may be ordered by the
court, together with any proof of receipt;
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to
be served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms
as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of
service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that
material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the
party against whom the process issued.
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a
copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person
serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to
deliver a copy thereof.
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service,
the person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the
summons left for the person being served, the date upon which the
same was served, and shall sign his or her name thereto, and, if an
officer, add his or her official title.
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any
proceeding where summons or other notice is required to be
published, the court shall, upon the request of the party applying
for such publication, designate the newspaper and authorize and
direct that such publication shall be made therein; provided, that
the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be
made and shall be published in the English language.
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990.)
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Rule 11
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of
Utah. The attorneys address also shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader
or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
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Rule 15
Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer,
unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
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(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission
may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in
its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.

Rule 33
Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties.
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon
any otlier party written interrogatories to be answered by the party
served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation, a
partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any
officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available
to the party. Interrogatories may, without leave of court, be served
upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any
other party with or after service of the summons and complaint
upon that party.
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the
reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. The
answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the
objections signed by the attorney making them. The party upon
whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of
the answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the
service of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve
answers or objections within 45 days after service of the
summons and complaint upon that defendant. The court may
allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an
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interrogatory.
(b) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers
may be used to tlie extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence.
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable
merely because an answer to the intei rogatory involves an opinion
or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact,
but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be
answered until after designated discovery has been completed or
until a pretrial conference or other later time.
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an
interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served
or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such business
records, including a compilation, abstract, or summary thereof and
the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party
served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify
the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained
and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable
opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to
make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A
specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating
party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served,
the records from which the answer may be ascertained.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds to Rule 33, F.R.C.P.
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Rule 37
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby,
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may
be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters
relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a
deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the
district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded
or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity
fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a
party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or
if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under
Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer,
or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination,
the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the
examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make
such protective order as it would have been empowered to make
on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this
subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a
failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or
attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the
Addendum 7: 10 of 15

opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the
motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the
making of the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the
motion among the parties and persons in a just mamier.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being
directed to do so by the court in the district in which the
deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a
contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule
35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f),
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from
introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
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(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is
unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the
attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or
the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's
fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the
admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he
might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for
the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers
to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve
answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33,
after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34,
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is
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pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure
as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused
by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award
of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as
provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a
party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule
26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such
party or his attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1,1987.)
Compiler's Notes. - This rule corresponds to Rule 37, F.R.C.P.

Rule 54
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need
not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the
record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
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absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be
given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate
rights of the parties on each side as between or among
themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically
prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall
be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs
against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be
imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within
five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party
against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the
items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and
file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
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within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at
the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings
of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date
judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk
must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if
the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within
two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any
case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount
thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make
a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4), relating to
the award of costs by the appellate court and costs in original
proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed with the
adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective
January 1, 1985. See, now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
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